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Opening Ballot Access to Political
Outsiders: How Third Parties Could
Use Cook v. Gralike to Challenge
the Dominance of America's
Two-Party System
[Tihe major parties have resisted a modification of the
current two-party system with every means at their
disposal. One of the most effective means of preserving
their dominance of American politics is their control, via
major party-dominated legislatures, over the electoral
process. Under the Elections Clause of the United States
Constitution, state legislatures are empowered to regulate
the time, place and manner of elections held in their
states. As an exercise of this power, every state in the
nation restricts the candidates that may appear on its
ballot. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
The two major political parties in the United States are
committed to their self-preservation and have the power to act on
that commitment. Individuals who wish to form a new political
party, or simply run for political office as independent candidates,
face an entrenched two-party system that has erected numerous
obstacles in their paths. Third party candidates perennially face
prohibitive ballot access laws, passed by Democrats and
Republicans, in various state legislatures across the nation.2 As a
1. Donald E. Daybell, Guarding the Treehouse: Are States "Qualified" to
Restrict Ballot Access in Federal Elections?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 289, 291 (2000)
(footnotes omitted).
2. David Cobb, Editorial, America Needs a Recount in Ohio, PROVIDENCE
J., Nov. 29, 2004, at A12. David Cobb was the Green Party's 2004
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result, despite voters' decreasing affiliation and identification with
the two major parties,3 those two parties have maintained their
dominance of American elections into the twenty-first century.
This Comment addresses how these obstacles affect federal
elections against the backdrop of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Elections Clause states that the "Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof."4 Since the
Elections Clause refers to states' powers to conduct federal -
specifically congressional, senatorial and, to a lesser extent,
presidential - elections, this Comment focuses on federal elections
and the states' regulations of federal elections. Historically, the
Court has relied heavily on constitutional provisions other than
the Elections Clause to assess the constitutionality of states'
regulations of federal elections.5 In the last decade, however, the
Court has placed greater reliance on the Elections Clause, as U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton6 and Cook v. Gralike7 illustrate.
With these two decisions, the Court distinguished procedural
regulations, which it found constitutionally permissible under the
Elections Clause, and substantive regulations, which it found
impermissibly outside the scope of the states' powers under the
Elections Clause.
Thornton rejected the argument that the Elections Clause
provided broad authority to the states to regulate elections.8
Instead, the Thornton Court stated that the Founding Fathers
"intended the Elections Clause to grant states authority to create
procedural regulations, not to provide States with license to
exclude classes of candidates from federal office."9 The regulation
at issue in Thornton would have prevented incumbent United
States Senators from Arkansas who had served two terms from
presidential candidate.
3. Anis Shivani, Bleak Prospects for the Democrats: Conservative Politics
in an Era of Dealignment, COUNTERPUNCH, Jan. 4, 2003,
http://www.counterpunch.org/shivani01042003.html.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
5. See infra Part III.
6. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
7. 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
8. 514 U.S. at 832.
9. Id. at 832-33 (emphasis added).
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being placed on the election ballot.' 0 Similarly, it would have
prevented incumbent United States Congressmen who had served
three terms from being placed on the election ballot." The
Thornton Court relied on the arguments made by James Madison
during the ratification debates, and by Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist Papers, to support the view of the Elections Clause as a
narrow grant of power to the states. 12 On one hand, the Thornton
Court viewed the "times, places and manner"13 language of the
Elections Clause as referring to "how... electors shall elect."14 This
language governs the procedures associated with conducting an
election and the Thornton Court found such procedures within the
purview of the states' power.15 On the other hand, regulations that
would "dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of
candidates, or.. .evade important constitutional restraints" were
not permitted under the Elections Clause. 16 These non-procedural
regulations were substantive in nature, as the Thornton Court
made clear in its distinction between procedural and substantive
regulations:
The provisions at issue in... our. . .Elections Clause cases
were.. .constitutional because they regulated election
procedures and did not even arguably impose any
substantive qualification rendering a class of potential
candidates ineligible for ballot position.17
Thus, forbidding incumbents from placing their names on the
ballot was unconstitutional and imposed a "substantive"
restriction because it disfavored a class of candidates -
incumbents - and dictated the outcome of the election by
removing that class of candidates from the ballot.'8
Whether one agrees with the Thornton Court's interpretation
of the Elections Clause, it did create a clear and usable test for
10. Id. at 783, 784.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 833-34.
13. Id. at 833 (emphasis in original) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 60 at
371).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 834.
16. Id. at 833-34.
17. Id. at 835.
18. Id.
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analyzing election regulations. Under Thornton, a regulation that
governs how an election is to be conducted would be categorized as
procedural and therefore constitutional. 19  A regulation that
prevents a certain group of candidates from getting on the ballot
would be categorized as substantive and therefore
unconstitutional. 20  What mattered in Thornton was that
incumbents were disqualified outright, regardless of whether they
had met all applicable procedural regulations to get on the
ballot. 21
The distinction between impermissible substantive exclusions
and allowable procedural regulations changed in Cook.22 In Cook,
the Court found a Missouri initiative requiring the instruction,
"DISREGARDED VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS,"
be placed next to the name of Missouri's incumbent congressmen
who did not oppose term limits and the instruction, "DECLINED
TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS," be placed next to the
name of non-incumbent candidates for Congress who refused to
support term limits, unconstitutional. 23 Instead of focusing on
how the regulation at issue dictated electoral outcomes, as had the
Court in Thornton, the Cook Court focused on how the regulation
placed its "targets at a political disadvantage" and found the
regulation unconstitutional for attempting to dictate electoral
outcomes.24  With this language, the Cook Court broadened
Thornton's definition of substantive regulations, thus opening the
door for challenges to election regulations by third parties and
independent candidates. Third parties and independent
candidates can now seize this opportunity to challenge the
constitutionality of long-accepted election regulations. This new
definition of "substantive" may give the judiciary more authority
to strike down election regulations once viewed as constitutional
and categorized by the Thornton Court as procedural and
somewhat benign. By seizing this opportunity, new parties and
independent candidates could alter the political landscape by




22. Cook, 531 U.S. at 525-26.
23. Id. at 514-15, 523-24.
24. Id. at 525-26.
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outside of the dominant two-party structure. By using the
substantive/procedural distinction in Cook, courts may be able to
re-categorize some seemingly neutral regulations, previously
categorized as procedural, as substantive regulations that
influence electoral outcomes and place certain candidates at a
political disadvantage. In doing so, these courts could remove
some of the obstacles faced by political outsiders in modern-day
U.S. elections.
This Comment opens with a discussion of the obstacles to
candidates outside the traditional two-party system. Part II
addresses those obstacles, as well as the difficulties political
outsiders face, by describing the entrenchment of the two-party
system, especially its unresponsiveness to new issues. Part III
discusses how the Court's treatment of federal election regulations
has touched on many parts of the Constitution: the First
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, Substantive Due
Process, the Qualifications Clause and the Elections Clause. 25
Part IV discusses Thornton's attempt to sort out some of the
Court's past election regulation jurisprudence by placing greater
emphasis on the Elections Clause than past courts and
articulating the distinction between substantive and procedural
election regulations. Part V discusses how the Court expanded
the definition of substantive regulations in Cook v. Gralike26 and
explains how this new definition has opened the door to legal
challenges from third parties and independent candidates. Part V
explores how the judiciary could embrace the new and broader
definition of substantive regulations in Cook and use that new
definition to recognize that some existing regulations traditionally
thought to be procedural (and constitutional) are more properly
viewed as substantive (and therefore unconstitutional)
regulations. This approach would fundamentally alter how
federal elections are conducted because many existing election
regulations could be categorized as substantive. To illustrate this
point, this Comment addresses several widely accepted
regulations and discusses how they may violate the broader Cook
definition of substantive regulations.
Finally, this Comment concludes by showing how the Court
25. See infra Part III.
26. Cook, 531 U.S. at 525-26.
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could use the Cook definition of substantive election regulations to
open up ballot access to third (and perhaps fourth and fifth)
parties as well as independent candidates, many of whom have
struggled to gain access to the ballot in the past. By using this
broader definition of substantive qualifications, the Court could
help break up the dominance of the two-party system, open up the
electoral system to disparate groups and individuals who
challenge the status quo and enhance the spirit of democracy.
II. THE TWO-PARTY STRANGLEHOLD
The Founding Fathers expressed major concerns over the
divisiveness of factions in the new republic.27 In The Federalist
Papers, James Madison defined a "faction" as a "number of
citizens.. .united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."28 Such
factions existed at the time of the nation's founding and exist
today, in the form of interest groups, lobbyists and political action
committees. The existence of these modern factions would not be
a surprise to the Founding Fathers because they saw factions as
inevitable. 29 They simply devised tools to control such factions.30
Chief among these tools is the concept of representative, as
opposed to pure, democracy. 31 According to this concept, citizens
elect individuals to represent their interests and those
representatives become responsible for discerning the country's
"true interest."32  In a representative democracy, federal
officeholders are responsible for controlling factions. 33 In their
roles as elected representatives, they come together and work out
the differences between various local interests by creating policies
27. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 150 (James Madison), in THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST (J.R. Pole ed., 1987) ("Among the
numerous advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves
to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the
violence of faction.").
28. Id. at 151.
29. Id. ("The.. .causes of faction are.. .sown in the nature of man.").





that strengthen the national interest.34
Other mechanisms created by the Founding Fathers also
contribute to controlling factions. These mechanisms include
federalism and the separation of powers, both of which Madison
described as necessary to control factions and protect the
citizenry:
In the compound republic of America, the power
surrendered by the people, is first divided between two
distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to
each, subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights
of the people. The different governments will controul
each other; at the same time that each will be controuled
by itself.35
The "two distinct governments" are the federal and state
governments, a vertical separation of power crucial to Madison's
concept of federalism. 36 The "distinct and separate departments"
are the legislative, executive and judicial branches - horizontal
separations that exist at both the federal and state level.37 These
three distinct power bases prevent any single "department" or
individual from gaining too much power. Together, these tools
also prevent any single faction from gaining too much power
because that faction would need to gain control over all those
governmental layers to dominate the nation's political agenda.
In addition to these tools, another has emerged: the two-party
system. While the Founding Fathers did not create the two-party
system, it has played a significant role in controlling factions
because it channels political conflict through two distinct pillars -
the Democrats and the Republicans. 38 These two major parties
have been firmly in place since the Civil War and, despite several
challenges to their dominance, 39 they remain the nation's two
34. Id.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 236 (James Madison), in THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: FOR AND AGAINST (J.R. Pole ed., 1987).
36. Johnson v. Cavell, 468 F.2d 304, 322 (3d Cir. 1972).
37. Id.
38. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND
REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (Rev. Ed.
Brookings 1983).
39. Since the emergence of the Republican Party during the Civil War,
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major political parties. In presidential elections since the Civil
War, serious third party challengers have failed to form
movements or parties with any significant staying power.40 The
U.S. Senate currently contains only one independent - Vermont's
Jim Jeffords - and he ran as a Republican before defecting from
the party after winning his re-election. 41 The U.S. House of
Representatives likewise has only one independent member,
Vermont's Bernard Sanders. 42 While the formation of a new
national party does not necessarily depend on the presence of
minor party representatives in Congress, the relative absence of
such individuals certainly does not bode well for the formation of a
new party in the near future.
Throughout American history, the two-party system has often
forced different factions or interest groups to focus their energy on
influencing the agendas of either one or both of the major parties.
These factions often work within the two-party system to force
change. The 1896 presidential candidacy of William Jennings
Bryan is illustrative. 43 His Populist takeover of the Democratic
party that year came after he had embarked on a series of lecture
tours throughout the country denouncing the administration of
the strongest showing by a third-party presidential candidate came in 1912,
when former president Theodore Roosevelt ran under the Bull Moose Party
label and finished second in both the popular vote and the Electoral College
(Woodrow Wilson won the 1912 election). T. HARRY WILLIAMS ET. AL, A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (SINCE 1865) 337 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1964). H.
Ross Perot's 1992 presidential candidacy, in which he finished third,
garnered nineteen percent of the popular vote and received zero Electoral
College votes, represents the second-strongest showing by a third-party
presidential candidate. See PresidentElect.org,
http://presidentelect.orgtel992.html.
40. Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose Party presidential candidacy in
1912 illustrates this point. A committed progressive, he left the Republican
Party and ran on the Bull Moose ticket in 1912. SUNDQUIST, supra note 38, at
177-80. However, his Bull Moose party had no staying power because it "was
a personal party, a party permeated with intense moral flavor." See V.0.
KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES & PRESSURE GROUPS 179 (5th ed. 1964).
Roosevelt's supporters "were no committed ideological bloc whose political
course was dictated by what was necessary to advance a program; they
merely followed a leader where he led." SUNDQUIST, supra note 38 at 180.
41. John Lancaster and Helen Dewar, Jeffords Tips Senate Power, THE
WASHINGTON POST, May 25, 2001, at Al.
42. Bernard Sanders, http://www.worldhistory.com/wiki/B/Bernard-
Sanders.htm.
43. See, e.g., SUNDQUIST, supra note 38, at 149-54.
OPENING BALLOT ACCESS
President Grover Cleveland and advocating for free silver.44 At
other times, the major parties absorb new ideas. During the
Progressive Era of the early twentieth century, the major parties
both made efforts to absorb the Progressives' ideas and agenda,
thus blunting the Progressives' ability to form a new party.45 As a
result of this two-party hegemony, one of the two major parties is
almost always sure to attain a legislative majority, whether at the
state or the federal level. This dominance is evident throughout
U.S. history and the failure of any third party to coexist for a
significant period of time with the two major parties demonstrates
that dominance.46
Despite its endurance and stability, the two-party system has
its flaws. It can encourage polarization, rather than consensus
and compromise. Two former U.S. Senators saw this polarization
emerging a decade ago when they bemoaned the "vanishing
bipartisan center in Congress."47 Sam Nunn, a Georgia Democrat,
described the voices of common sense in Washington as being
"drowned out by the extremes in both parties, who are usually
wrong but never in doubt."48  Bill Cohen, a Maine Republican,
similarly lamented his increased marginalization within his own
party, seeing a "limit to what... [he] could achieve" as a moderate
in an increasingly conservative GOP.4 9
A second and perhaps more significant flaw of the two-party
system is the major parties' unresponsiveness to new issues. They
often ignore such issues until they almost rupture the political
system, or even the nation.50 As former Chief Justice Warren
44. Id. at 150-154.
45. Id. at 170.
46. See FRANK J. SORAUF, PARTY POLITICS IN AMERICA 37 (2d ed., Little,
Brown and Company 1972).
47. Eric Schmitt, Even G.O.P. Asking Nunn Not to Retire from Senate,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at A10.
48. Kevin Sack, Nunn, Model Southern Democrat, to Retire from Senate
Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1995, at Al.
49. Francis X. Clines, Senator Cohen, G.O.P. Centrist, Plans to Retire,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1996, at Al.
50. In the pre-Civil War political system, the Whig and Democratic
Parties ignored the slavery issue for so long that it ruptured not only the
political system, but the nation. After both the Whigs and Democrats failed
to incorporate the abolitionist or anti-slavery ideas of the Liberty and Free
Soil Parties, the Republican Party was created as a vehicle for the anti-
slavery movement voice. The creation of the Republican Party forced the
20051
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noted:
History has amply proved the virtue of political activity
by minority, dissident groups, who innumerable times
have been in the vanguard of democratic thought and
whose programs were ultimately accepted .... The
absence of such voices would be a symptom of grave
illness in our society.5 1
Throughout the nation's history, third parties and
independent candidates have often been responsible for major
reforms, ranging from abolition to Progressive Era legislation. 52 A
more recent example is H. Ross Perot's 1992 third-party
presidential candidacy, which focused attention on issues such as
the national deficit that had received relatively little attention
from the major parties.53 Political forces and figures, like Perot,
who are historically "outside the two major parties have [often]
been fertile sources of new ideas and new programs... [and] many
of their challenges to the status quo have in time made their way
into the political mainstream."54 Perot, the Progressives, the
abolitionists and other political "outsiders" illustrate how, in
American political life, "third parties are often important channels
through which political dissent is aired."55
Unfortunately, the current electoral system does not protect
Whig Party into extinction. This example demonstrates the extent to which
the major parties resist new ideas. In the case of the Whigs and the
Democrats, their reluctance to incorporate new ideas into their parties may
have helped lead to the Civil War. See SUNDQUIST, supra note 38, at 76-79.
51. Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957).
52. In response to the growing abolitionist movement in the 1840s and
1850s, the "major party politicians in the North moved as far toward the
abolitionist pole as necessary to absorb most of the movement, to the
frustration of third-party politicians." SUNDQUIST, supra note 38, at 58. The
Progressive movement is often credited with enacting major reforms of the
early twentieth century, including the Clayton Act (which exempted labor
from antitrust laws), the Abramson Act (which mandated an eight-hour work
week for railroad workers), the Federal Farm Loan Act (which created banks
to make long-term loans at low interest rates), the creation of the Federal
Reserve System and the prohibition of child labor. KEY, supra note 40, at
181.
53. Joe Klein, Stalking the Radical Middle, NEWSWEEK, Sep. 25, 1995, at
36.
54. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983) (citing Illinois State
Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 186 (1979)).
55. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 39 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
OPENING BALLOT ACCESS
these "important channels." Instead, the two-party system
"unquestionably favors Democrats and Republicans at the expense
of minor parties and independents, simply because the Democrats
and Republicans came into existence first and were.. .the ones
who wrote the rules."56  These rules include ballot access
restrictions and other election regulations, created mostly by state
legislatures dominated by the two major parties.57 These election
regulations represent the products of a system designed to
perpetuate itself. While the Court has "squarely held that
protecting the Republican and Democratic Parties from external
competition cannot justify the virtual exclusion of other political
aspirants from the political arena,"58 it sometimes has contributed
- whether wittingly or unwittingly - to that very exclusion.5 9
Many Americans are also increasingly skeptical of the major
parties, as their support for a viable third party demonstrates. 60
In the mid-1990s, advocates for congressional term limits
attempted to break up this two-party stranglehold by trying to
reduce the number of terms a Congressman or Senator could serve
in Washington. 61 These advocates ran into a brick wall when the
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that individual states
could not impose term limits on federal officeholders. 62 However,
the concerns brought up by term limits advocates and other
outsiders to the two-party system have not disappeared. Voters
and candidates who neither agree with nor identify with either of
the major parties continue their struggle.63
56. Daybell, supra note 1, at 326.
57. See generally id.
58. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 802.
59. Daybell, supra note 1, at 325-26.
60. Kevin Cofsky, Pruning the Political Thicket: The Case for Strict
Scrutiny of State Ballot Access Restrictions, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 353, 420
(1996).
61. See Gloria Borger, Welcome to Gingrich Nation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Nov. 21, 1994, at 45.
62. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 838.
63. See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). While the State of
Missouri was not directly advocating for term limits, it was trying to force its
representatives in Congress to advocate for term limits with the ballot labels
its voters had approved.
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III. THE MUDDLED HISTORY OF ELECTION REGULATIONS
JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE THORNTON
Prior to Thornton's distinction between substantive and
procedural election regulations, the Court did not use a consistent
approach to analyze federal election regulations. 64 Before the
1980s, the court's jurisprudence in the area of election regulations
could be described as a grab-bag of constitutional catchphrases, 65
ranging from Due Process and Equal Protection to Free Speech
and Free Association. 66 For example, in Anderson v. Martin, the
Court found a Louisiana statute requiring the designation of a
candidate's race on the ballot as an Equal Protection violation. 67
At other times - often within the same cases - the court
emphasized the right to vote.68 Within these cases, other justices
cited even more options for analyzing election regulations. 69
These various rationales - free association, Equal Protection, the
right to vote and Due Process - demonstrate the lack of a cohesive
approach to analyzing the constitutionality of election regulations
during the 1960s and 1970s.
In the early 1980s, the court attempted to merge some of
these approaches in Anderson v. Celebrezze.70 In Anderson, the
Court created a balancing test, weighing the First Amendment
(freedom of association) and Fourteenth Amendment (Equal
64. Cofsky, supra note 60, at 420.
65. Id.
66. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) (finding Ohio's
election code violated the First Amendment right of free association and the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause); see also Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 140-41 (1972); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
67. 375 U.S. 399 (1964). The regulation at issue involved a regulation of
a state election, but the rationale to strike down the attachment of a
candidate's race next to his name on the ballot as unconstitutional would
apply equally to a regulation of a state or federal election.
68. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 30 (citing the "right of qualified voters.. .to
cast their votes effectively"); see also Bullock, 405 U.S. at 144 (discussing a
filing fee scheme's "real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the
franchise").
69. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 41 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I would rest
this decision entirely on the proposition that Ohio's statutory scheme violates
the basic right of political association.. .which is protected against state
infringement under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment")
(citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1964) (emphasis added)).
70. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
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Protection) against the states' interests in regulating elections:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude
of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the
Court must not only determine the legitimacy and
strength of each of those interests; it also must consider
the extent to which those interests make it necessary to
burden the plaintiffs rights. Only after weighing all
these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide
whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional. 71
In Anderson, the Court stated that an election contest is not a
static event. 72  Rather, an election is fluid where new and
emerging issues "create [potential] opportunities for new
candidacies." 73 In Anderson, the Court specifically found that the
state's interests in voter education, political stability and equal
treatment for major party and independent candidates were
insufficient to justify a March filing deadline for independent and
third party candidates in the presidential election, which took
place eight months later, in November.74 The Court ruled that
such regulations unfairly burdened the independent candidate's
political opportunity.75
Under this rationale, states need to be mindful of ensuring
that potential candidates have the opportunity to give voice to new
issues. The 2004 presidential election provides a modern-day
example. While neither major party candidate took a strong
stance against American involvement in Iraq, Howard Dean's
candidacy, as well as numerous opinion polls, demonstrated that a
sizeable portion of voters were against American involvement
there.76 However, Ralph Nader's struggles to gain the necessary
71. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
72. Id. at 790.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 796, 800.
75. Id. at 805-06.
76. Exit polls on Election Day 2004 indicated that forty-five percent of
those polled disapproved of the decision to go to war with Iraq and that forty-
six percent believed that the war with Iraq has improved the United States'
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signatures to get on all fifty states' ballots77 illustrated how the
two-party system hampered his political opportunity to express
this alternative point of view.
IV. THE BIRTH OF THE PROCEDURAL/SUBSTANTIVE DISTINCTION UNDER
THE ELECTIONS CLAUSE
The Anderson test drew heavily from the election regulation
cases that preceded it, because it focused primarily on the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause to assess the
constitutionality of those regulations.78 However, over a decade
later with Thornton, the Court made a clear shift in its
jurisprudence by relying on the Elections Clause to strike down
term limits imposed by Arkansas voters on congressional
representatives and U.S. Senators.7 9  The Elections Clause
provides that the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State
by the Legislature thereof."8 0 The Court described the Elections
Clause as a grant of "broad power" to the states to prescribe
procedural regulations for holding elections for federal offices.8 '
In Cook, the Court relied on a seventy-year-old definition of
procedural regulations as "safeguards which experience shows are
necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right [to vote]. " 82
Such safeguards are justified by the practical need to ensure that
elections are fair and honest and accompanied by order rather
than chaos.8 3 These concerns demonstrate how the court has
given states a certain measure of discretion to ensure that federal
elections run fairly and in a manner that minimizes confusion to
long-term security. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Moral Values Cited as a
Defining Issue of the Election, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at P4.
77. Kate Zernike, Nader Ballot Petitions Present a Phone Book Full of
Problems, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 8, 2004, at A21. Nader's attorneys also attempted
to use this argument to strike down signature requirements in Illinois,
arguing that independent candidacies often develop in response to national
events that come to the fore during the campaign season. See Nader v. Keith,
No. 04 C 4913, 2004 WL 1880011, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004).
78. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783.
79. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 832-38.
80. U.S. CONST. art I, § 4.
81. Cook, 531 U.S. at 523 (citing Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn.,
479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986)).
82. Id. at 524 (citing Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)).
83. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
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voters.
That discretion has its limits. While the Court recognizes
that procedural regulations for conducting elections are within the
purview of the states' constitutional powers, it has simultaneously
carved out a category of substantive regulations that states are
forbidden to impose on federal elections: ". . .the Framers
understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue
procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate
electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to
evade important constitutional restraints." 4 In short, if a state's
proposed regulation would decide the outcome of federal elections,
then it should not pass constitutional muster.85
A. Defining Procedural Regulations
Procedural regulations are constitutional because they govern
how an election is conducted. At the procedural end of the
spectrum, the Court has described allowable state regulations as
"notices, registration, supervision of voting.., counting of votes,
duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication
of election returns." 6 The Court has described such regulations as
neutral, "generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that
protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process
itself."8 7
In Thornton, the Court reviewed its prior election regulation
cases and explained that the provisions at issue in those cases
were constitutional "because they regulated election procedures
and did not even arguably impose any substantive qualification
rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible for ballot
position."88 Several cases, which Thornton cited, provide examples
of procedural regulations that the Court has found constitutional.
In Storer v. Brown, the Court upheld the following provisions of
the California Election Code: (1) denial of ballot access to an
independent candidate who registered his affiliation with a
qualified political party within one year prior to the preceding
84. Cook, 531 U.S. at 523 (citing Thornton, 514 U.S. at 833-34 (emphasis
added)).
85. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 830-31.
86. Cook, 531 U.S. at 523-24.
87. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983).
88. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 835.
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primary election (known as a non-partisan requirement for
independent candidates), (2) a requirement that all such
signatures be obtained during a twenty four-day-period following
the primary election (known as a time limit for signature-
gathering) and (3) a corresponding requirement that none of the
signatures be those of voters who voted in the primary (known as
a guarantee of demonstrated support).8 9 The Court upheld these
restrictions because the state has an "interest... to protect the
integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent
candidacies" and to prevent intra-party feuding from spilling into
general election contests.90 Similarly, in Jenness v. Forston, the
court upheld the following provisions of the Georgia Election Code:
(1) a requirement that a political party obtain twenty-percent of
the vote in the most recent gubernatorial or presidential election
to gain a place on the ballot in the subsequent election (known as
automatic ballot access for the major parties), (2) a requirement
that non-party candidates receive the signatures of five percent of
the voters eligible to vote in the last election to gain ballot access
(known as signature requirements) and (3) a time limit.
requirement for signature-gathering (180 days).91 The Thornton
Court suggested that these regulations would be categorized as
permissible "procedural" regulations.92
B. Defining Substantive Regulations
Defining substantive election regulation is elusive. In
Thornton, the Court helped crystallize the procedural/substantive
distinction when it struck down an amendment to the Arkansas
Constitution that would have made it unlawful for incumbent
Congressmen and Senators to have their names placed on the
ballot.93  Decided in the mid-1990's, Thornton represented a
landmark decision that sounded the death knell for states' ability
to impose term limits on federal officeholders. 94 Term limits had
89. Storer, 415 U.S. at 726-27.
90. Id. at 733, 735.
91. Jenness v. Forston, 403 U.S. 431, 439-40 (1971). See also American
Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 772-74 (1974).
92. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 834-35.
93. The Arkansas regulation, which was the result of a statewide voter
initiative, would have restricted an individual Senator to two six-year terms
and an individual Congressman to three two-year terms. Id. at 784.
94. Terence M. Fitzpatrick, The Speech or Debate Clause: Has the Eighth
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been a major element of the Republican Party's platform during
its sweeping electoral victories in the 1994 midterm elections. 95
Despite strong public support for term limits, however, the Court
struck them down.96 It stated that the Arkansas regulation did
not fall within the scope of the state's power under the Elections
Clause because the clause did not provide states "with license to
exclude classes of candidates from federal office."97 Thus, the
Court made a clear statement that patent exclusion of certain
candidates from the ballot could never be interpreted as a
procedural regulation. Rather, it represented a substantive
regulation designed to dictate the outcome of the election.
The Thornton Court did not, however, ground its entire
analysis in the Elections Clause. It placed perhaps even greater
emphasis on how the regulation violated the Constitution's
Qualifications Clauses and on how the regulation disrupted the
somewhat delicate constitutional balance between federal and
state power.98 The Court stated that the "Framers decided that
the qualifications for service in the Congress of the United States
be fixed in the Constitution and be uniform throughout the
nation."99 States accordingly did not have the power to add to, or
delete from, those qualifications. Permeating the Thornton
Court's discussion of the Qualifications Clauses were the premises
that universal qualifications for federal officeholders are a
necessary element of the constitutional framework and that
allowing states to change those qualifications would "erode the
structure envisioned by the Framers."100 While these sentiments
Circuit Gone Too Far?, 68 UMKC L. REV. 771, 772 (2000).
95. Id. at 771.
96. Id. at 772.
97. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 832-33.
98. See generally id.
99. Id. at 837.
100. Id. at 838. While this Comment does not focus on the Qualifications
Clause, it is necessary to mention its important role in the development of
the court's jurisprudence in the area of state control of federal elections.
Many of the same concerns and arguments over federalism and the proper
balance between state and federal power that have influenced the court's
interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses have also influenced its
interpretation of the Elections Clause. The two clauses can be discussed
separately, but some overlap occurs in the case law and in commentators'
critiques. See Daybell, supra note 1, at 316, 317. Much of the reasoning used
to strike down or uphold a particular ballot access requirement could be used
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also underlie the Court's Elections Clause analysis in Thornton,
further discussion of the procedural/substantive distinction came
six years later in Cook.
V. CooK's BROADENED DEFINITION OF SUBSTANTIVE REGULATIONS
In Cook, the Court moved the boundary between substantive
and procedural regulations when it struck down a Missouri
initiative that (1) instructed each member of Missouri's
congressional delegation to vote to pass a Congressional Term
Limits Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, (2) required that the
statement "DISREGARDED VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM
LIMITS" be printed next to the name of Missouri's incumbent
congressmen who did not follow the voters' instructions and (3)
required the statement "DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT
LIMITS" be printed next to the name of non-incumbents who
refused to take a pledge to vote for a Congressional Term Limits
Amendment.101 The lower courts both had relied on Thornton to
find the Missouri initiative unconstitutional.1 0 2  In fact, the
Supreme Court clearly stated that "although the Court of Appeals'
decision is consistent with the views of other courts that have
passed on similar voter initiatives, the importance of the case
prompted our grant of certiorari."10 3 The Court could easily have
allowed the lower court decisions to settle the matter, but
appeared to have other reasons for granting certiorari on an issue
of "importance." 0 4 In taking the case, the Court broadened its
definition of substantive election regulations, but supported its
new definition with reasoning that could be used to subsume
many existing procedural regulations within the substantive
category.
Thornton had stated that it was impermissible for a state to
to support the court's interpretation of either Clause.
101. Cook, 531 U.S. at 514-15.
102. See Gralike v. Cook, 996 F. Supp. 917, 920 (W.D. Mo. 1998)
(describing the Missouri ballot label as having the "likely effect of
handicapping a class of candidates for Congress"); see also Gralike v. Cook,
191 F.3d 911, 924 (8th Cir. 1999) (describing the Missouri ballot label as
seeking to "impose an additional qualification for candidacy in Congress
an... . [doing] so in a manner which is likely to handicap term limit
opponents.").
103. Cook, 531 U.S. at 518.
104. Id.
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deny ballot access to an incumbent congressional candidate
because it absolutely excluded a class of candidates from
consideration and thus dictated "electoral outcomes."1 o5 The
Thornton decision had defined substantive regulations as those
that dictated electoral outcomes by excluding a class of candidates
from the ballot - and therefore excluding those candidates from
the election - versus a procedural regulation that governed the
time, place and manner of casting ballots.10 6 Under Thornton, a
procedural regulation may exclude a candidate from the ballot,
but a substantive regulation will always do so. Thus, even if one
of Arkansas' incumbent congressmen or Senators followed every
procedural regulation imaginable, no matter how burdensome, to
get on the ballot, the problem with the Arkansas term limit
regulation was that it excluded the candidate from the ballot
anyway. Such exclusion of particular candidates' (namely
incumbent congressmen's) names from the ballot would dictate
the electoral outcome because voters would never get the
opportunity to vote for incumbents after they had served a
designated number of terms. The Thornton Court found that
dictating electoral outcomes in this way was unconstitutional.1 0 7
Unlike the incumbent congressmen in Thornton, the
candidates opposed to term limits in Cook were not being excluded
from the ballot. However, Cook applied a broader version of the
Thornton dictation-of-electoral-outcomes test to the labels
Missouri wished to place next to candidates' names: "While the
precise damage the labels may exact on candidates is disputed
between the parties, the labels surely place their targets at a
political disadvantage to unmarked candidates for congressional
office."108  Such labels were substantive, not procedural,
regulations and thus violated the Elections Clause. 0 9 The labels,
which the courts below had described as "pejorative," "negative,"
"derogatory," "intimidating" and akin to a "Scarlet Letter," were
struck down because they "handicap candidates 'at the most
crucial stage in the election process - the instant before the vote is
105. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 833.
106. Id. at 833-34.
107. Id. at 838.
108. Cook, 531 U.S. at 525 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 526.
2005]
292 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:273
cast."'110 This expansion of the Thornton test for substantive
regulations rests on the principle that states cannot influence
election outcomes or exert pressure on voters by drawing issue
distinctions between the candidates inside the ballot box."'
VI. How PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS BECOME SUBSTANTIVE UNDER
THE COOK REASONING
At first glance, Cook may appear to be a logical application of
Thornton's distinction between substantive and procedural
election regulations. The Court in Cook reasoned that "pejorative"
issue labels did not pass constitutional muster because of (1) the
influence such labels will have on some voters and (2) the fact that
such labels will ultimately and unfairly influence the electoral
outcome.11 2 The problem with this reasoning is that influencing
an electoral outcome is quite different than dictating an electoral
outcome. Clearly the exclusion of certain candidates dictates an
electoral outcome - it restricts voters' choices by removing certain
candidates' (such as incumbents') names from the ballot. Such
was the situation in Thornton. Once term limits were imposed,
even if an incumbent candidate met all signature requirements
mandated by a particular state and petitioned for ballot access
well in advance of any state-imposed deadlines, that candidate
would still not get a place on the ballot. The state's election
regulation dictated an electoral outcome because it had created an
absolute bar to the presence of a candidate's name on the ballot.
By contrast, attaching a statement regarding an issue position
next to a candidate's name falls short of dictating an electoral
outcome. Such was the situation in Cook. Attaching a statement
regarding an issue position next to a candidate's name may dictate
the outcome by calling attention to an issue many, or even most,
voters care about, but it does not necessarily do so. Thus, while
Thornton's dictating-electoral-outcomes test addressed situations
where a class of candidates was denied ballot access, Cook asked
courts to examine whether a state law would "handicap" a
110. Id. (citing Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964) (emphasis
added)).
111. Robert Alexander Schwartz, The Nature of Consent in the American
Republic: Substance or Procedure? The Elections Clause and the Single-
Member Congressional Districts, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 467, 476 (2004).
112. Cook, 531 U.S. at 525-26.
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candidate or put a candidate at a "political disadvantage."1l13
Handicapping a candidate is less burdensome than excluding a
candidate from the ballot altogether. After Cook, many so-called
procedural (and constitutionally permissible) regulations under
Thornton could now fall into the category of substantive
regulations because they do what Cook prohibits. These
regulations, while perhaps appearing "evenhanded," often
influence election results by handicapping certain candidates,
namely third party and independent candidates, and also place
such candidates at a political disadvantage. They do so by forcing
these candidates to overcome obstacles to gaining ballot access
and getting elected which major parties and major party
candidates simply do not face.
The following non-exhaustive list of examples demonstrates
how some so-called procedural election regulations are arguably
invalid under the Cook test because they handicap certain
candidates and place them at a political disadvantage: (1)
signature requirements for non-major party candidates to gain
access to the ballot, (2) automatic ballot access for established
parties and (3) the listing of party affiliations on ballots. Each of
these regulations could be re-categorized as substantive under
Cook.
A. Signature Requirements
Every state imposes some form of ballot-access signature
requirements on all candidates for offices, regardless of their party
affiliation.114  These signature requirements do not explicitly
exclude a class of non-major party candidates from the ballot.
However, they do create significant obstacles for non-major party
candidates to get on the ballot. Across the nation, the number of
signatures for major party candidates is almost always lower than
the number required for minor party and independent
candidates. 115 In addition, the lack of major party resources
presents further difficulties for aspiring non-major party
candidates:
There are two ways that candidates can gather the
113. Id. at 525.
114. Daybell, supra note 1, at 294.
115. Id. at 294-95.
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signatures necessary to fulfill the ballot access signature
requirements. First, a candidate can hire a company to
collect the necessary signatures .... The other alternative
requires a candidate to mobilize a large force of volunteer
campaign workers to canvass the streets seeking petition
signers .... Unlike a major party candidate, a minor party
candidate will not have the party-supplied support staff
of volunteers to man the telephones, run the field offices,
or conduct get-out-the-vote campaigns. In either case, the
minor party candidate must expend substantial resources
that the major party candidate can devote to other
aspects of his or her campaign. 116
Under Cook, these signature requirements could be
categorized as substantive because they handicap non-major party
candidates and place them at a political disadvantage. They also
do not apply equally to the major parties vis-A-vis independent
candidates. They force independent candidates to spend more
time and resources than major party candidates to achieve the
same goal: access to the ballot. In essence, "the[se] signature
requirements have effectively created an uneven playing field"
between major party candidates and non-major party
candidates. 1 7
B. Automatic Ballot Access for the Major Parties
Similarly, after Cook, automatic ballot access for "established"
political parties may no longer fall into the procedural category.
Many states reserve a place on the ballot for the Democratic and
Republican parties and their candidates because of the strong
support they have received in previous elections."18 Ralph Nader,
aware of this obstacle in 2000, made it part of his platform to
obtain five percent (5%) of the vote nationwide, a figure which
would have guaranteed his party a position on every state ballot
in 2004."1 He failed in that task, garnering just under three
116. Id. at 297.
117. Id. at 299.
118. Richard Winger, Ballot Access for Minor Candidates, in MINOR
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND PARTIES OF 1992: A REFERENCE 5-8 (Glenn Day
ed., 1992).
119. Patrick Barrett, The Presidential Race and Green Party Strategy in
2004, Jul. 18, 2004, http://www.gp.org/articles/barrett_07_18-04.html.
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percent (3%) of the vote nationwide. 120 However, minor-party
candidates for federal and state offices at all levels are confronted
with this same obstacle every election year. If a party has not
demonstrated that it has strong support, ballot access is denied
and a minor party candidate is forced to collect signatures to gain
a place on the ballot.121 Even if successful in that effort, the
minor-party candidate still needs to obtain a certain percentage of
the vote in the election to gain ballot access for his party in the
next election cycle. 122  This restriction clearly discriminates
against minor party candidates, but it does not categorically
exclude them from the ballot and thus would have represented a
procedural regulation under Thornton and prior Elections Clause
cases. However, while automatic ballot access for major parties
does not dictate electoral outcomes, it certainly influences such
outcomes. It meets the Cook definition of handicapping a certain
class of candidates (minor parties and their members) and placing
them at a political disadvantage. Therefore, under Cook's
reasoning, automatic ballot access provisions for established
parties are substantive and therefore unconstitutional.
While signature requirements and automatic ballot access for
major parties should be categorized as substantive regulations
under Cook's reasoning, defenders of such regulations may argue
that they should remain in the procedural category because of the
states' interest in preventing chaotic and confusing elections.1 23
The Court has recognized these interests, which include
preventing the clogging of election machinery, avoiding voter
confusion and assuring that the winner of an election is the choice
of the majority, or at least a strong plurality, of the voters.1 24
Accordingly, the Court has ruled that the states can regulate the
number of candidates that appear on the ballot 125 in the interest of
protecting the political process from frivolous and fraudulent
candidacies.' 26  In upholding the constitutionality of election
regulations in Storer, the Court pointed out that the state
120. PresidentElect.org, http://presidentelect.org/e2000.html.
121. See Daybell, supra note 1, at 294-95.
122. See id. at 296.
123. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 724, 732 (1974).
124. Id. (citing Jenness v. Forston, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971)).
125. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
126. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442.
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"apparently believes with the Founding Fathers that splintered
parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant damage
to the fabric of government. " 127
These practical interests in maintaining order reflect the
concerns raised by the Court in Anderson.128 While maintaining
order and preventing chaos are valid state concerns, they cannot
be used to justify election regulations that purposely favor the two
established major parties. Continuing to categorize signature
requirements and ballot access for the two major parties as
procedural regulations that the states can make under their
Elections Clause powers would allow the two major parties to
maintain their dominance in American politics. These regulations
are not evenhanded because they erect larger obstacles in front of
third parties and independent candidates seeking ballot access.
Such unfair regulations should not survive in their current form.
C. Party Labels
Party labels present a different challenge then that presented
by signature requirements and automatic ballot access provisions.
States typically place the party affiliation of major party
candidates next to their names on the ballot.129 The state's
interest in providing such information to the voters is even less
related to its interests in preventing voter confusion or clogging
election machinery. Rather, the Court's reasoning in Cook fails to
distinguish the Missouri ballot labels regarding opponents of term
limits from other information typically found on the ballot, such as
the aforementioned party labels.130 The impact that a party label
and an issue position label, such as on the one struck down in
Cook, could have on voters' decisions is comparable:
A candidate's party affiliation is a single piece of
information to which the state draws voters' attention by
printing it on the ballot. Indeed, listing party affiliation
is merely a shorthand way of listing a bundle of policy
commitments held by the affiliated candidate. This
127. Storer, 415 U.S. at 736.
128. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796, 800 (1983).
129. James A. Gardner, Neutralizing the Incompetent Voter: A Comment
on Cook v. Gralike, 1 ELECTION L. J. 49, 52 (2002).
130. Id.
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makes it unlikely that the defect in the Arkansas ballot
label law could have been the sin of providing information
on the ballot about candidates' substantive
positions .... There are many jurisdictions in which
having the word "Democrat" or "Republican" printed next
to one's name all but guarantees electoral defeat. Yet it
seems clear that no candidate could successfully object to
state law requiring disclosure on the ballot of party
affiliation.131
After Cook, a challenge by an individual candidate to the
placement of a partisan label on the ballot next to his name should
not be discarded so lightly. A party label acts as a "clue" for voters
with strong partisan attachments and provides a significant
political advantage (or disadvantage) to one candidate over (or
against) other candidates. For example, a Republican candidate
running for Congress in a district with an overwhelming number
of registered Republican voters will almost certainly want his
party label on the ballot. His Democratic opponent, on the other
hand, may not be so enthusiastic about having his party label next
to his name on the ballot. For many voters in a Republican
district, that "Democratic" label would probably be "pejorative"
and at the very least "negative."132 Such voters may have never
voted for a Democratic candidate in the past or they may perceive
all Democrats as members of a national party they distrust. In
such a strong Republican district, the "Democratic" party label
may not truly differ from the "pejorative" issue position labels
found unconstitutional in Cook. While the Democratic label does
not guarantee electoral defeat in this district, it does handicap the
Democratic candidate and place him at a political disadvantage.
In addition, just as Missouri's forbidden issue label in Cook would
have a substantive effect on voters' decisions at a crucial moment
in the voting process - right before the vote is cast - the same is
true of a party label. In fact, many less informed voters simply
rely on this clue of party affiliation to make their decision and do
not take the time to research the various candidates' positions on
the issues.133
131. Id. at 52-53.
132. See Cook, 510 U.S. at 524.
133. Many jurisdictions encourage this reliance by allowing voters to vote
2005]
298 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol.11:273
This argument is not theoretical. Many of the nation's
congressional districts are dominated by voters who historically
vote for either Democratic or Republican candidates.134 Battles
between the parties over redistricting indicate that both political
parties know that it is in their best interest to create
congressional districts dominated by voters most likely to vote for
their candidates. These seemingly blind partisan preferences may
explain why many localities have decided to remove party labels
from the ballot. 135 These localities are perhaps making an effort to
break up one or both parties' dominance, forcing voters to learn
more about candidates in local elections and discouraging voters
from pulling the Democratic or Republican lever on Election Day.
D. Rethinking the Distinction between Procedural and
Substantive Regulations
The broadening of the definition of substantive regulations in
Cook makes it difficult for future courts to continue to categorize
many existing election regulations as procedural. Of course, one
could ignore the Cook court's rationale for why the Missouri ballot
labels were substantive and interpret Cook as a narrow decision
which focused on the "pejorative" nature of the Missouri ballot
label - "DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS."
- to strike it down. 136 Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in
Cook demonstrated this approach, relying on the First
a straight-party Republican or Democratic ticket on Election Day. See, e.g.,
STATE OF TEXAS, SAMPLE BALLOT (2004),
http://www.co.travis.tx.us/countyclerk/election/20041102/04novbedsheetball




134. See generally MICHAEL BARONE and GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 2000 (National Journal Group, Inc. 1999).
135. Perhaps the best example of removal of party labels comes from
Nebraska, where a nonpartisan unicameral legislature is elected by
Nebraskans. Candidates for election to Nebraska's unicameral legislature do
not have their political party affiliations, or labels, next to their names on the
election ballot. Instead, the two candidates who obtain the most votes in the
primary election face each other in the general election. The History of
Nebraska's Unicameral Legislature,
http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/learning/history.htm.
136. Vicki C. Jackson, Cook v. Gralike: Easy Cases and Structural
Reasoning, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 299, 309 (2002); Cook, 531 U.S. at 514-15.
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Amendment rather than the Elections Clause to strike down the
Missouri labels. 137 Rehnquist's concern was "with the government
speaking in a pejorative way about a.. .political candidate and the
[fact that the] pejorative speech is a condition for appearing on the
ballot."13s Had the court adopted Rehnquist's reasoning, the
pejorative labels would represent a violation of free speech and
therefore would be unlawful in both federal and state elections.1 39
However, the Cook majority, by relying on the Elections Clause,
took a different path. Under the majority's reasoning, the use of
issue labels - pejorative or otherwise - in state elections was not
directly addressed, and therefore was left open.
Had the Cook Court analyzed the Missouri issue label as a
violation of free speech, as suggested by Rehnquist, it would not
have disrupted the procedural/substantive distinction articulated
in Thornton. The "pejorative" label would have been forbidden in
any state or federal election and the issues of federalism that
underlie Elections Clause jurisprudence would not have come into
play. 40 By relying on the Elections Clause, the court clearly
broadened its definition of substantive regulations to include a
condition which was not excluding anyone from the ballot. The
implication of this new definition is that it has opened the door for
third parties and independent candidates to challenge election
regulations, not for dictating the electoral outcome because they
exclude a class of candidates from the ballot, but for handicapping
those candidates and placing them at a political disadvantage.
This lower threshold of what encompasses an unconstitutional
regulation is easier to meet and makes it easier for courts post-
Cook to strike down election regulations than it was under
Thornton.141
137. Jackson, supra note 136, at 327; see also Cook, 531 U.S. at 530-31
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
138. Jackson, supra note 136, at 327.
139. See generally Cook, 531 U.S. 510 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
140. Id. at 530-31 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
141. A review of some subsequent decisions since Cook demonstrates that
federal courts have not relied heavily on Cook or explored the dimensions of
its broader definition of "substantive" regulations in analyzing the
constitutionality of election regulations. Cartwright v. Barnes provides an
example. 304 F.3d 1138, 1142 (2002). In that case, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit relied mostly on Thornton to uphold Georgia
election regulations similar to those upheld by the Court three decades ago in
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VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court faced a choice when Cook
came to it on appeal. The majority could have adopted the
reasoning in Justice Rehnquist's concurrence 142 and struck down
the Missouri ballot labels on First Amendment grounds because of
their pejorative nature. Instead, the Court chose a different route
by strengthening and expanding its Elections Clause
jurisprudence and redefining the scope of impermissible
"substantive" election regulations. This redefinition not only
includes regulations that dictate the outcomes of federal elections
because they patently exclude candidates from the ballot, but also
could include regulations more subtle in their application that
influence, but do not necessarily dictate, the outcomes of federal
elections.
By articulating a broader definition of a substantive
regulation, the Court must now confront the realities of this new
definition. If Cook is taken seriously, it will be difficult for courts
to continue to uphold certain regulations, such as signature
requirements, automatic ballot access for major parties and
especially party labels, as neutral "procedural" regulations that do
not seek to influence electoral outcomes. With Cook, the Court
has opened the door for minor parties and independent candidates
to challenge these regulations as substantive regulations that
violate the Elections Clause.
Reforms aimed at opening up the federal electoral process,
such as removal of party labels from states' ballots for federal
elections, would not destroy the two parties overnight - and
perhaps not ever. The essence, and thus the accompanying
stability, of the two-party system would remain intact: the two
major parties would not disband simply because ballots did not
include the "Democrat" or "Republican" label next to candidates'
names. Instead, the major parties would continue their
operations because of their continued incentive to field candidates
who agree on a set of unifying issues. The all-or-nothing aspects
Jenness. 403 U.S. 431 (1970). The Court does not invoke Cook's language
regarding handicapping certain candidates or placing them at a "political
disadvantage." In fact, it only mentions the Cook case once in a footnote.
Cartwright, 304 F.3d at 1142, n.4.
142. See generally Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
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of American elections - including the Electoral College143, winner-
take-all elections144 and single-member congressional districts145 -
would still provide significant incentives for voters to vote for
major party candidates. 146
However, removal of the party labels, as well as other reforms
to break the two-party stranglehold, would represent a welcome
breath of fresh air. Such reforms may not destroy the two-party
system, but they could provide access for more dissident political
voices. As a start, removal of party labels would prevent voters
from pulling the Democratic or Republican lever. Without party
labels as a guide, voters, no longer able to rely on party labels to
decide for whom to vote, would be forced to learn at least a little
bit more about the various candidates for political office. This
shift would probably not take place overnight, but as incumbents
retired, new candidates would have the opportunity to run on a
fresher slate.
This change would also achieve a traditional goal of third
parties and independent candidates - a broader and more vibrant
political debate:
The minor party's often unconventional opinions broaden
political debate, expand the range of issues with which
the electorate is concerned, and influence the positions of
the majority, in some instances becoming majority
positions. And its very existence provides an outlet for
voters to express dissatisfaction with the candidates or
platforms of the major parties. 147
In short, just as they have in the past, minor parties and their
candidates could make the major parties more responsive to the
emergence of new issues. Such reforms would help even the
playing field between the two-party system and political outsiders
by equalizing the rules that apply to both major and minor party
candidates in their quests to gain access to the ballot. With easier
143. THEODORE J. Lowi AND BENJAMIN GINSBERG, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
FREEDOM AND POWER 537 (2d ed. W.W. Norton & Co. 1992).
144. See id. at 474.
145. Id. at 523-27.
146. SORAUF, supra note 46, at 37.
147. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 200 (1986)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
2005]
302 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 11:273
access to the ballot, the major parties may be less likely to
trivialize the influence of their dissident members and may make
greater efforts to accommodate them. If the major parties ignored
new issues, then perhaps dissenters within one or both parties
could more easily form a new party to reflect and advocate for that
issue. This persistent and real threat to the two parties could
create a broader dialogue within the parties and perhaps across
the entire political system. While the two major parties may well
continue to control the electoral process through the domination of
state legislatures across the country, they would no longer be able
to take that dominance for granted. Cook has opened the door for
political outsiders to challenge that dominance. Now the judiciary
must keep that door open.
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